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The Magnitudes of Economic and 
Non-Economic Factors on the Demand 
for U.S. Domestic Air Travel
by Ju Dong Park and Won W. Koo
The	primary	purpose	of	this	study	is	to	analyze	air	carriers’	behavior	in	capturing	market	share	
by	examining	the	economic	factors	affecting	passenger	behavior	toward	air	travel.	This	study	also	
examines	non-economic	factors	such	as	seasonality,	unexpected	events	(9/11	attack),	mergers,	and	
trends.	Because	 the	airlines	 included	 in	 this	study	compete	with	each	other,	seemingly	unrelated	
regression	estimation	(SURE)	is	used	to	estimate	the	parameters	of	the	demand	models	which	have	
correlated	error	terms.	The	economic	and	statistical	relationship	of	the	factors	with	air	passenger	
miles	 provides	 valuable	 information	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 demand	 for	 the	 U.S.	 air	
passenger	industry.	In	examining	demand	determinants,	this	study	concludes	that	air	fare,	income,	
seasonality,	and	mergers	play	significant	roles	in	determining	the	demand	for	air	passengers.
INTRODUCTION
The airline industry plays an important role in transporting people in the United States. U.S. 
domestic air passenger miles substantially increased from 114 billion in the first quarter of 2000 
to 151 billion in the third quarter of 2012 (U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2012). With the 
growth of the U.S. airline industry, competition among airlines and its impacts on passenger travel 
have become the prevailing issue in air transportation economics since the Airline Deregulation 
Act of 1978,which undoubtedly, was the most important event affecting the airline industry. It 
partially shifted control for air travel from the political platform to the marketplace. Competition 
among major airlines under deregulation brought some benefits, such as air fare reductions, and 
improvements in capacity utilization for the U.S. airline industry. As shown in Figure 1, the total 
U.S. domestic airline passenger miles increased by 31% while passenger miles for the top five U.S. 
carriers1 increased by 41% during the period of 2000:Q1-2012:Q3.
Figure 2 shows the U.S. nominal and real average air fares per passenger mile for the period of 
2000:Q1-2012:Q3. The nominal average air fare in the United States increased by three cents (2000 
U.S. dollar) for the 12 years; however, the real average air fares per passenger mile decreased by two 
cents for the same period. In general, U.S. domestic air fares decreased from 2000 to 2012, resulting 
in an increase in U.S. domestic air travel.
The primary purpose of this study is to analyze air carriers’ behavior in capturing market share 
by examining the economic factors and non-economic factors that affect passenger behavior toward 
air travel in the United States. Some of the factors are air fare, disposable income, seasonality, the 
9/11 attack, and mergers.
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Figure 1: U.S. Domestic Air Passenger Miles for the Period of 2000:Q1-2012:Q3
Source: The T-1 tables, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2012.
Figure 2: U.S. Nominal and Real Average Air Fares per Passenger Mile 
   for the Period of 2000:Q1-2012:Q3
Source: T-1 tables, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2012.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many studies have investigated the effects of demand for air passenger services using various 
methods. Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995) investigated carrier demand in a competitive 
context and analyzed air carrier choice to assess the market share and revenue implications of 
service design, pricing, marketing, and promotional strategies. Later, Proussaloglou and Koppelman 
(1999) extended the conceptual framework and applied it to the choice of carrier, flight, and fare 
class as a basis for analyzing air travel demand in a competitive market. Brons, Pels, Nijkamp, and 
Rietveld (2002) used meta-regression analysis to investigate the determinants of price elasticity 
for inter-continental and international airline services and to identify both common and contrasting 
factors that influence price elasticity.
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Njegovan (2006) examined outbound demand for leisure air travel in the United Kingdom 
using a demand system that takes into account the ways in which the expenditure on air fares 
interacts with both the expenditure on non-fare components2 of travel abroad and with expenditure 
on domestic leisure. He used the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) models and found that there 
are strong interactions between air-travel expenditures, other costs of travel abroad, and expenditures 
on leisure activities in the United Kingdom.
More recently, Chi and Baek (2012) studied short- and long-term effects of determinants of the 
demand for U.S. air passengers. The authors used the Johansen co-integration analysis and a vector 
error-correction (VEC) model. NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations) was used as a proxy for measuring business travel while U.S. disposable income was 
used as a proxy for measuring leisure passengers. Chi and Baek (2012) found that air fare, disposable 
income, and NASDAQ had significant effects on U.S. air passenger demand in the long run while 
the combined short-run dynamic effects of disposable income, NASDAQ, population, and air fare 
explained changes in air passenger miles.
Nelson, Dickey, and Smith (2011) analyzed the factors affecting the number of visitors to 
Hawaii from the U.S. mainland. The authors used a double-log form for the airline-demand model 
and found that cross sectional (spatial) air fare elasticities, on an annual basis, were high and growing 
over time, but the results estimated from the time series analysis (temporal) were much lower.
However, studies in this field have paid little attention to the empirical analysis of passenger 
demand for air travel in the United States. In this study, an econometric model is developed to 
estimate price elasticity, cross-price elasticity, and income elasticity of the demand for U.S. domestic 
air passengers. Only the top five U.S. carriers are used for this study because their average market 
share from 2000 to 2012 is 59.84% of the entire market (U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
2012). Based on our empirical analysis, we evaluate domestic air passengers’ behavior among the 
top five carriers, examining the impact of economic and non-economic variables.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act was passed to remove government control over the pricing of 
airline services, operating service routes, market entry and exit, as well as inter-carrier agreements 
and mergers. Under the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulation, air carriers’ investments and 
operating decisions were highly restricted. With the CAB controlling the operating routes, market 
entry/exit, and air fare, the airlines were limited to competing only on food, cabin crew quality, 
and flight frequency. As a result, air fares and flight frequency were high while load factors3 were 
low. Since the deregulation in 1978, the air-transportation market has changed significantly. Airline 
companies can now control air fares, operating routes, and flight frequency. Therefore, flight 
frequency is much lower with higher load factors than before deregulation. Borenstein and Rose 
(2007) found that the average load factors for domestic scheduled service climbed from lows of 
under 50% prior to deregulation, to over 60% in the mid-1980s, remaining above 70% since the late 
1990s and hitting 83% in 2011. Although the U.S. airline industry was deregulated under the 1978 
Airline Deregulation Act, the industry’s infrastructure, such as regulation of airport facilities, still 
remains subject to government control.
Under deregulation of the airline industry, the number of passengers at major hub airports grew; 
therefore, airline companies attempted to capture more passengers using various methods. One such 
alternative is low-fare, no frills,4 and point-to-point service. For instance, Southwest Airlines began 
offerings its then unique short haul, no frills, low priced, and interstate service. During the 1990s, 
Southwest moved into the ranks of the nation’s top 10 airlines. Most recently, several major airlines, 
including Continental, Delta, United, and US Airways, have created subsidiaries that offer low-fare, 
low-frill, and point-to-point services using economy-sized aircraft.
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Nonstop services for U.S. domestic air travel began to increase in the late 1990s. This change 
corresponded to the widespread introduction of regional jets (RJs), jet aircraft with capacities of 
fewer than 100 seats that are more efficient than propeller aircraft and/or larger jets. For medium 
length routes, RJs’ low seat-mile costs were capable of supporting airline service in small cities. The 
ability to serve such markets economically with small jet airliners created the possibility of adding 
smaller cities and more frequent services to the spokes airports from the hubs, and it also created 
point-to-point services in the marketplace. Thus, the recent trend in the airline industry is an increase 
in small jet aircraft service while either maintaining or reducing large jet aircraft service.
Figure 3 shows the passenger miles among the major U.S. air carriers for passenger travel 
during the period of 2000:Q1-2012:Q3. American Airlines increased its passenger miles by 5%, 
Delta Airlines by 32%, Southwest Airlines by 140%, United Airlines by 34%, and US Airways by 
41%. However, extraordinary decreases in passenger miles for the five major air carriers occurred in 
the fourth quarter of 2001, immediately after the September 11 attacks.
US Airways increased its market share during the fourth quarter of 2007 through the first quarter 
of 2008 as the result of a merger with America West at the end of 2005. In the middle of 2008, Delta 
Airlines and Northwest Airlines agreed to merge, resulting in increased passenger miles for Delta 
Airlines from the fourth quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2010. A merger of United Airlines and 
Continental Airlines in 2010 brought an improvement in passenger miles from the fourth quarter 
of 2011 to the first quarter of 2012. These three mergers significantly affected the domestic airline 
market for passenger services.
Figure 3:  Domestic Air Passenger Miles of the Top Five U.S. Carriers for the Period of 
    2000:Q1-2012:Q3
Source: The T-1 tables, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2012.
In addition, alliances between airlines vary from a limited marketing arrangement, such as 
sharing frequent-flyer programs, to more complex agreements, such as code-sharing. Code-sharing 
forms the basis of most airline alliances and allows airlines to sell seats on partners’ flights as if these 
flights were their own. Firms use code-sharing agreements for different reasons, such as indirect 
entry into markets where costs and regulatory barriers would make direct entry impossible, the 
expansion of networks, and increasing service quality.
Code-sharing agreements operate under either the blocked-space system or the free-sale 
system. With the blocked-space system, aircraft capacity is shared between marketing carriers5 and 
the operating carrier.5 The marketing carrier buys a block of seats from the operating carrier, sells 
them to its passengers as its own seats, and keeps all the revenue from those sales. The operating 
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carrier cannot sell any of the seats assigned by the marketing carrier, and both carriers charge fares 
independently. With the free-sale model, all partners have free, real-time access to the operating 
carrier’s seats, and there is no fixed limit on how many seats the marketing carriers can sell. 
Moreover, the marketing carrier determines its fares independently from the operating carrier. All 
revenue from seats that the marketing carrier sells under the free-sale system is kept by the operating 
carrier.
For example, suppose a passenger buys an indirect ticket from A to C through B from American 
Airlines, where the flight from A to B is operated by American Airlines and the flight between B and 
C is operated by US Airways. Under a code-sharing agreement and a free-sale system between them, 
American Airlines would keep all the revenue generated from the A to B flight and US Airways 
would keep all the revenue generated from the B to C flight. If there is not a code-sharing agreement 
between American Airlines and US Airways, a passenger who is looking for a flight from A to C will 
not buy his/her ticket from American Airlines because it does not offer the service from A to C. As a 
result, the passenger will buy his/her ticket from another carrier, and American Airlines will lose this 
passenger. Therefore, it is preferable for American Airlines to accept the code-sharing agreement 
to earn positive revenue from A to B, rather than losing passengers. Because it is hard to clarify the 
measurement of revenue passenger miles and the total revenue for air carriers during a certain time 
period in a given dataset from the U.S. Department of Transportation, concerns about code-sharing 
effects on air passenger miles and air fares are ignored in this study.
As mentioned previously, there have been four major mergers among U.S. domestic airlines 
in the last 12 years. Many policy makers are concerned that mergers would substantially reduce 
competition, increase air fares, and cut service while airline companies say that a merger would 
reduce their operating costs and allow them to offer lower prices and better service. Airline mergers 
create advantages and disadvantages for air passengers. On the down side, the merger would lead 
to a consolidation of routes, giving an airline a monopoly over a particular route, which might 
cause the fare to increase. However, the merger can open an entry for another airline to operate 
service in the market and to start charging less. Table 1 shows U.S. airline mergers and acquisitions 
since 2000. There were a total of 12 mergers among U.S. airline companies in the last 13 years. 
This study includes the mergers of US Airways with America West Airlines (2005), Delta Airlines 
with Northwest Airlines (2009), and United Airlines with Continental Airlines (2010). The merger 
between American Airlines and US Airways is not included in this study mainly because the merger 
occurred in 2013, which is the last observation included in this study.
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Table 1: U.S. Airline Mergers and Acquisitions
Date
Air Carrier Resulting Entity
Announced Closed
01/10/2001 04/09/2001 American Airlines / TWA American Airlines
04/22/2005 05/09/2011 Republic Airways / Shuttle America Republic Airways
05/19/2005 09/27/2005 US Airways / America West Airlines US Airways
08/15/2005 09/08/2005 SkyWest / Atlantic Southeast Airlines SkyWest  / ASA
01/18/2007 01/18/2007 Pinnacle Airlines / Colgan Air Pinnacle Airlines / Colgan Air
11/19/2008 Southwest Airlines / ATA Airlines Southwest Airlines
04/14/2008 12/31/2009 Delta Airlines / Northwest Airlines Delta Airlines
06/23/2009 07/31/2009 Republic Airways / Midwest Airlines Republic Airways
08/14/2009 10/01/2009 Republic Airways / Frontier Airlines Republic Airways
05/03/2010 10/01/2010 United Airlines / Continental Airlines United Airlines
08/04/2010 11/15/2010 SkyWest / Atlantic Southeast Airlines / ExpressJet Airlines SkyWest / SureJet
09/27/2010 05/02/2011 Southwest Airlines / AirTran Airways Southwest Airlines
07/01/2010 07/01/2010 Pinnacle Airlines / Mesaba Airlines Pinnacle Airlines / Mesaba Airlines
02/14/2013 12/09/2013 US Airways / AMR / American Airlines American Airlines (AAL)
Source: Airlines for America.
THE MODEL
This study developed a theoretical model of demand for air passenger services through maximizing 
passengers’ utility under a given budget constraint. Following McCarthy (2001), the utility function 
for the air transportation passengers and their budget constraint are specified as follows:
(1)
individual’s budget constraint is
(2)
where PM	i is total passenger miles of the airline company i	(i=1,2,…,n); AF	i is air fare per passenger 
mile of the air carrier i	(i=1,2,…,n); and INC is individual’s budget allocated for air travel.
The Lagrangian equation is formed from equations (1) and (2) as follows:
(3) 
The first differential of equation (3) with respect to PM	i and  yield
(4)
(5)
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Equating equations (4) and (5) to zero and solving  yield demand for air travel as:
(6)
Based on equation (6), we specified an empirical demand model of each airline. Airlines 
considered in this study are American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, 
and US Airways. In addition, the demand model includes non-economic variables representing 
seasonality for passengers’ preference of season for their air travel. Another additional non-economic 
variable included in the model is the September 11 terrorist attacks to examine whether the attack 
affects air travel. We also added dummy variables representing mergers between US Airways and 
America West Airlines in 2005, Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines in 2009, and United Airlines 
and Continental Airlines in 2010. The empirical model also includes the trend variable to examine 
whether there is a general trend in passengers’ air travel in the U.S. The empirical model is specified 
as:
(7)
where  is the total passenger–miles of U.S. domestic carrier i at time period t;  is the air fare 
per passenger mile of carrier i at time period t;  INCt is the disposable income per capita; SE is a 
dummy variable representing the seasonal effects; SEP_ATT is a dummy variable representing the 
impact of the September 11 attack; MER is a dummy variable representing the impact of mergers 
among airline companies. Equation (7) is re-specified under a double log functional form as:
(8)
where α is the intercept term and the βs,γs, δs, and τs are coefficients of corresponding variables. 
ln  is log value of the total air passenger miles (billions) of carrier i in time t,  is log value 
of average air fare per mile (U.S. dollar) of carrier j in time t, lnINCt		is log value of average per 
capita disposable income (thousands of U.S. dollars) in time t. In addition, s are seasonal dummy 
variables for Spring ( ), Summer ( ), and Fall ( ),   is a dummy variable representing the 
September 11 attack, and  s are dummy variables for mergers of US Airways ( ), Delta Airlines 
( ), and United Airlines ( ). Finally,  TRE represents trend variable and εit	 is the random error 
terms.
The estimated coefficient (βij) represents own and cross price elasticites. It is expected βij	< 0 for 
i=j and  βij	< 0 or βij	> 0 for i	≠	j, depending upon the relationship between the airlines. If two airlines 
are substitutes for each other,  βij	> 0 for i	≠	j and  βij	< 0 for i	≠	j if the airlines are complements. The 
estimated coefficient (γi) represents income elasticity and is expected to be positive. The coefficient 
(δih) represent seasonal effects and the sign is expected to be either positive or negative, depending 
upon passengers’ preference of seasons for their travel. The estimated coefficient ( ) represents 
the September 11 terrorist attack and the sign of the coefficient is expected to be negative mainly 
because of passengers’ hesitation to fly for the short period just after the attack. The coefficient 
(δk) represents the effects of the airline merger, and the signs are expected to be positive. Finally, τi 
represents the general trend of passenger travel by air, and the sign is expected to be either positive 
or negative.
∑ β ∑ δ ∑ δ
U.S. Domestic Air Travel
54
DATA
To analyze the effects of economic factors and non-economic factors on major air carriers’ passenger 
miles in U.S. domestic air transportation service, time-series data for passenger miles and air fare per 
passenger mile are collected for the following major U.S. carriers: American Airlines (AA), Delta 
Airlines (DEL), Southwest Airlines (SW), United Airlines (UA), and US Airways (US). Quarterly 
data for 2000:Q1 through 2012:Q3 were used for this study.
The total air passenger miles are used as a proxy for air passenger demand and are collected 
from T-1 tables published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) in the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (USDOT). The tables (T-1) summarize the T-100 traffic data reported by air carriers. 
The monthly data compiled by U.S. air carriers include available seat miles (ASMs), available 
ton miles (ATMs), revenue passenger miles (RPMs), revenue ton miles (RTMs), revenue air hours 
(RAHs), revenue miles flown (MILES), and revenue departure performed (FLIGHTS). Because 
quarterly data were used for this study, quarterly RPMs are calculated by summing monthly data.
The average air fare per passenger mile is used as a proxy for air fare and is obtained from F41 
tables published by the BTS in the USDOT. The F41 tables contain financial information on large 
certified U.S. air carriers and include balance sheets, cash flow, employment, income statements, fuel 
cost and consumption, and aircraft operating expenses. Large certified carrier means the air carrier 
that holds the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the USDOT with annual 
operating revenues of $20 million or more. Since F41 tables provide quarterly data for operating 
revenues by airlines, an average air fare per passenger mile for U.S. domestic air passenger service 
of each air carrier was calculated by dividing total operating revenues by total RPMs as a proxy 
of average air fares by each airline. Since this study focuses on aggregate demand for air travel in 
the United States, the price variables (average air fare per passenger mile) by airlines are the most 
appropriate in estimating the price effect on aggregate demand for air travel by airlines.7 Stratifying 
the data by flight length will provide the relationship between air fare and distance; however, this 
study is not focused on this issue.
The U.S. personal disposable income per capita is from the B-30 table, U.S. Government 
Printing Office (2012). Table B-30 provides quarterly data for disposable personal income. The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for air fare and the general CPI were used separately to calculate 
the real value for air fare and disposable personal income. Both the general CPI and CPI for air 
fare were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), United States Department of Labor 
(2012). The data used for empirical analysis contain 51 quarterly observations.
Summary statistics for the dataset are presented in Table 2. This study includes only the top 
five airline companies in the United States for the period of 2000:Q1 to 2012:Q3 mainly because 
more than 50% of total market share is accounted for those five airline companies (Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics 2012). In Table 2, average air fare per mile is measured in U.S. dollars 
adjusted by the CPI for air fare and average per capita income is measured in thousands of U.S. 
dollars and adjusted by CPI.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Airlines
Variable
INCt
American Airlines
Max 236 0.167
Max: 37.925
Min: 25.094
Mean: 31.094
s.d: 4.234
Min 150 0.122
Mean 202 0.145
s.d 19.26 0.022
Delta Airlines
Max 252 0.204
Min 134 0.123
Mean 185 0.173
s.d 31.44 0.031
Southwest Airlines
Max 226 0.149
Min 95 0.112
Mean 158 0.125
s.d 39.02 0.024
United Airlines
Max 246 0.191
Min 123 0.125
Mean 167 0.164
s.d 26.37 0.027
US Airways
Max 124 0.230
Min 63 0.158
Mean 92 0.191
s.d 19.84 0.033
Data sources: U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Government Printing Office, and U.S. Department of Labor.
Standard Deviation is abbreviated as s.d. in the table.
Total air passenger miles (billions) of carrier i in time period t	is abbreviated as  in the table.
Average air fare per mile (US dollars) of carrier i in time period t is abbreviated as  in the table.
Average per capita disposable income (thousands of US dollars) in time period t is abbreviated as INCt in the table.
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Autocorrelation was tested by using the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics. If autocorrelation is present, 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is no longer the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) (Stock 
and Watson 2010). The DW tests for AA, DEL, and SW under the double-log model indicates 
that the test is inconclusive because the values of the DW test were between 1.039 (critical value 
of lower bound) and 1.748 (critical value of upper bound) at the 1% significant level. The DW 
statistics for UA and US are close to 2, which accepts the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
To correct for the presence of first-order serial correlation for AA, DEL, and SW, the Yule-Walker 
(YW) method was applied. After serial correlation correction, all variables of the DW test were 
close to 2, indicating that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is accepted.
The F-test is used to test a joint hypothesis for seasonality. For the test, we developed two 
models: an unrestricted model including seasonal dummy variables and a restricted model excluding 
seasonal dummy variables. The null hypothesis is H0 : δi1 = δi2  =  δi3 =  0 and the alternative hypothesis 
is Ha : δi1 ≠ δi2  ≠  δi3 ≠  0. If H0  is rejected, there is seasonality in the industry. The test statistics are 
calculated as follows:
(9)
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where SSE is the sum of squared errors. The subscript represents type of model; UR represents 
unrestricted model and R represents restricted model.
Table 3 shows the result of the F-tests for seasonality for each airline. The null hypothesis of no 
seasonality for all five air carriers are rejected since the values of the F-test for seasonality are 13.219 
(AA), 9.742 (DEL), 98.420 (SW), 26.132 (UA), and 6.928 (US), respectively. Since all values of 
F-test for seasonality are greater than the critical value of F(3,40)(=4.31) at the 1% significant level, 
it is concluded that there is seasonality of demand for domestic air passengers, especially for those 
five major airlines in the United States.
Table 3: Result of F-test for Seasonality
Air Carrier
Sum	of		Square	Error	(SSE)
F-testUnrestricted 
Model
Restricted 
Model
American Airlines (AA) 0.0416 0.0839 13.219***
Delta Airlines (DEL) 0.1901 0.3363 9.742***
Southwest Airlines (SW) 0.0226 0.1937 98.420***
United Airlines (UA) 0.2014 0.6169 26.132***
US Airways (US) 0.1929 0.2984 6.928***
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The t-test was used to examine the effects of the terrorist attack on September 11 and each 
merger. To test effect of the September 11 attack, the null hypothesis is  ;  and the 
alternative hypothesis is . If H0 is rejected, there is an impact of the attack on the 
industry; otherwise, there is no impact of the attack on the industry. Likewise, the t-test was used to 
test the effect of each merger on the U.S. domestic airline industry. The null hypothesis is H0:δ1 = 0 
for US Airways’s merger and the alternative hypothesis is Ha:δ1 ≠ 0. For the Delta Airlines’s merger, 
the null hypothesis is H0:δ2 = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is Ha:δ2 ≠ 0. Lastly, for the United 
Airlines’s merger, the null hypothesis is H0:δ3 = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is Ha:δ3 ≠ 0. If H0 
is rejected, there is an impact of mergers on the industry; otherwise, there is no impact of mergers 
on the industry.
Since the airlines included in this study compete with each other, Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Estimation (SURE) by Zellner (1962) is used to estimate the parameters of the demand 
models under an assumption that individual demand models are correlated through error terms. In 
other words, if the residuals of individual demand equations are correlated with one another, SURE 
is more efficient than single equation estimation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).
Table 4 shows the results of SURE of the demand for U.S. domestic air travel. The system	R2 is 
0.9746, indicating that the independent variables in the model explains 97% of the variation of the 
dependent variables.
In the demand model for air passengers of American Airlines, own price elasticity of demand is 
-0.909 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level, indicating that AA’s passenger miles 
increases by 0.909% when its air fare per passenger mile decreases by 1%. Its cross price elasticity 
with Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and United Airlines are 0.149, -0.009, and 0.057 and they 
are not statistically significant; however, its cross price elasticity of demand for US Airways is 
0.543 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level. This indicates that these two airlines 
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Table 4: Result of Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE)
Variable AA DEL SW UA US
Intercept
5.531
(1.27)
14.42
(1.65)
3.954
(1.43)
2.074
(0.30)
11.923*
(1.76)
LNAFAA
-0.909***
(-2.77)
0.770
(1.28)
0.414*
(1.99)
0.684
(1.29)
1.406***
(2.77)
LNAFDEL
0.149
(0.66)
-1.06**
(-2.51)
-0.146
(-1.01)
-0.415
(-1.14)
-0.444
(-1.27)
LNAFSW
-0.009
(-0.04)
0.264
(0.72)
-0.45***
(-3.53)
1.089***
(3.33)
0.3996
(1.29)
LNAFUA
0.057
(0.39)
0.127
(0.46)
0.215**
(2.28)
-0.298
(-1.23)
0.210
(0.91)
LNAFUS
0.543***
(3.47)
0.558**
(1.95)
0.273**
(2.75)
0.640**
(2.56)
-1.893***
(-6.63)
LNINC
1.294**
(2.51)
0.404
(0.39)
1.505***
(4.60)
2.131**
(2.59)
0.495
(0.62)
D1
0.012
(0.58)
0.009
(0.25)
-0.09***
(-6.32)
0.394
(1.16)
-0.036
(-1.08)
D2
0.083***
(3.96)
0.142***
(3.62)
0.089***
(6.67)
0.232***
(6.98)
0.088***
(2.69)
D3
0.100***
(4.27)
0.182***
(4.11)
0.098***
(6.61)
0.312***
(8.35)
-0.027
(-0.72)
D4
-0.209***
(-4.99)
-0.068
(-0.87)
-0.002
(-0.09)
0.054
(0.81)
-0.086
(-1.32)
D5
0.241***
(4.98)
D6
0.320***
(5.80)
D7
0.262***
(5.19)
TRE
-0.029***
(-2.77)
0.008
(0.38)
0.041***
(7.21)
-0.04***
(-2.49)
-0.030**
(-2.15)
System	R2 0.9746
dfa 192
Degree of Freedom is abbreviated as df  in the table.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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compete with each other in most routes. Income elasticity of demand for American Airlines is 1.294 
and is statistically significant at the 5% significant level. If per capita income increases by 1%, AA’s 
passenger miles increase 1.294%. Since the estimated coefficients of seasonal dummy variables for 
summer and fall are 0.083 and 0.100 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level, AA’s 
passenger miles increase by 0.083% and 0.100% during summer and fall, respectively. However, 
the estimated coefficient of seasonal dummy variable for spring is 0.012 and insignificant. The 
estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for the September 11 attack is -0.209 and statistically 
significant at the 1% significant level, indicating AA’s passenger miles decreased by 0.209% as a 
result of the September 11 attack. Lastly, the estimated coefficient of trend variable is -0.029 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% significant level.
In column (3), Delta Airlines’s own price elasticity of demand is -1.06 and statistically 
significant at the 5% significant level. This implies that passenger miles of DEL decrease by 1.06% 
for every 1% increase in its air fare per passenger mile. Its cross price elasticity with US Airways 
is 0.558 and statistically significant at the 5% significant level, indicating that they compete with 
each other in most routes. The cross price elasticities of American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and 
United Airlines are 0.770, 0.264, and 0.127, respectively, but are not statistically significant. Income 
elasticity of demand is 0.404 but insignificant for Delta Airlines. This might be interpreted that Delta 
Airlines is likely to have more business travel passengers than leisure travel passengers. In general, 
leisure travel passengers are more sensitive to air fare than business travel passengers. The estimated 
coefficient of seasonal dummy variable for summer and fall are 0.142 and 0.182 and statistically 
significant at the 1% significant level while spring is 0.009 but insignificant. DEL’s passenger miles 
increase by 0.142% and 0.182% during summer and fall, respectively, and are significant at the 1% 
level. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for the September 11 attack is -0.068, but 
insignificant, which means DEL’s passenger miles may not have been affected by the September 
11 attack. The estimated coefficient for mergers between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines is 
0.320 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level, indicating that passenger miles of Delta 
Airlines increased after the merger with Northwest Airlines in the middle of 2008. The estimated 
coefficient of the trend variable is 0.008 but insignificant.
In column (4), the price elasticity of demand for Southwest Airlines is -0.45 and statistically 
significant at the 1% significant level. When air fare per passenger mile decreases by 1%, passenger 
miles increase by 0.45%. Its cross price elasticity of demand for American Airlines, United Airlines, 
and US Airways are 0.414, 0.215, and 0.273 and statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 5% 
significant levels, respectively, indicating that they compete with each other. SW’s cross price 
elasticity with Delta Airlines is -0.146 but is not significant. Income elasticity of demand is 1.505 
and statistically significant at the 1% significant level, indicating an increase in passenger miles by 
1.505% for every 1% increase in per capita income. The estimated coefficient of seasonal dummy 
variables for spring, summer, and fall are -0.09, 0.089, and 0.098 and statistically significant at the 
1% significant level, indicating seasonality in passenger demand for airline service. The estimated 
coefficient of dummy variable for the September 11 attack is -0.002 but statistically insignificant. 
This means that SW’s passenger miles were not affected by the September 11 attack. The estimated 
coefficient of trend is 0.041 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level.
In column (5), United Airlines’s own price elasticity of demand is -0.298 and not significant. 
UA’s cross price elasticity of demand with Southwest Airlines and US Airways are 1.089 and 0.640 
and are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. This means that they compete 
with each other in most routes. On the other hand, the cross price elasticity with DEL is -0.415 but 
not significant, indicating limited competition between them. Income elasticity of demand for UA is 
2.131 and statistically significant at the 5% significant level. This means passenger miles increased 
by 2.131% for every 1% increase in per capita income. The estimated coefficients of summer and 
fall seasonal dummy variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that passenger 
demand for UA’s air service is seasonal. The estimated coefficient of dummy variable for the 
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September 11 attack is 0.054 but statistically insignificant, which means UA’s passenger miles were 
not affected by the September 11 attack. The estimated coefficient for the merger of United Airlines 
is 0.262 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level. This indicates that passenger miles 
of United Airlines increased by 0.262% as a result of the merger with Continental Airlines in 2010. 
The estimated coefficient of trend is -0.04 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level.
In column (6), the price elasticity of demand for US Airways is -1.893 and statistically 
significant at the 1% significant level; therefore, US Airways passenger miles increase by 1.893% 
for every 1% decrease in its air fare per passenger mile. Its cross price elasticity of demand with 
American Airlines is 1.406 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level, meaning that they 
compete with each other. The cross price elasticity with Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and 
United Airlines are not significant. This implies that these airlines have limited competition with 
one another. Income elasticity of demand is 0.495 and is not statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient of seasonal dummy variable is 0.088 and statistically significant at the 1% significant 
level for summer; and are -0.036 and -0.027 and not significant for spring and fall, respectively, 
indicating weak seasonality. The estimated coefficient of dummy variable for the September 11 
attack is -0.086 but not significant. The estimated coefficient for the merger between US Airways 
and America West is 0.241 and statistically significant at the 1% significant level. This indicates that 
the merger increased passenger miles of US Airways. The estimated coefficient of trend is -0.030 
and statistically significant at the 5% significant level.
CONCLUSIONS
This study discussed the impact of economic and non-economic factors on demand of air passengers 
in the United States. The economic and statistical relationship of the factors on air passenger miles 
provides valuable information to understand the nature of the demand for U.S. air travel. In examining 
demand determinants, this study concludes that air fare, income, seasonality, and mergers among 
air carriers play significant roles in determining the demand for air passenger service. The study 
reveals that the major airlines in the United States compete with each other. However, the degree of 
competition differs on routes served by the airlines. This study found that demand of U.S. domestic 
air passengers is seasonal. Unexpected events such as the September 11 attack had a limited impact 
on passenger demand. Mergers among airline companies affected passengers’ demand for U.S. 
domestic air travel significantly.
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Endnotes
1. American Airlines (AA), Delta Airlines (DEL), Southwest Airlines (SW), United Airlines 
(UA), and US Airways (US).
2. Non fare component means the fare charged is not based on between two consecutive fare con-
struction points. The point of origin and the point of destination of a fare component are fare 
construction points.
3. The percentage of the seats that were filled.
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4. A no frills airline is an airline that offers low fares but eliminate all non-essential services, such 
as complimentary drinks and snacks, no free check-in baggage, in-flight entertainment systems, 
business-class seating, and so on.
5. The airline that sells seats to its customers, sets its fares independently, and does not use its 
own aircraft to operate the flight; it uses its partners’ aircraft (the operating carriers) under the 
code-sharing agreement.
6. The airline with the aircraft whose passengers board under the code-sharing agreement.
7. Air fares vary over distances between origins and destinations. However, we use average air 
fare by airlines in the U.S. since the purpose of this study is to evaluate aggregate demand for 
air travel in the U.S. without considering segments between origins and destinations.
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